SECRET
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VIA AIR BOOK DISPATCH NO. 321

8 AUG 1957

TO: Certain Stations and Bases [redacted] July 1957

FROM: Chief, SR

SUBJECT: GENERAL: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/Operational
SPECIFIC: Indications of Possible RIS Connections of Soviet Officials Abroad

ACTION REQUIRED: None, for information and files

1. Attached is a check list of possible external indications of actual RIS employment on the part of Soviet officials abroad. Some of the information previously was sent to the field, but in disconnected form in various studies and dispatches. The list was compiled from limited sources (three year old information from [redacted] plus recent observations of KUBARK personnel in a very few field stations). Despite this limitation, however, the points in the list appear to set patterns. No claim is made that the list provides a certain means of identifying RIS officers using official cover; it is meant only to provide a handy guide that will assist KUBARK field officers in obtaining leads on possible RIS officers.

2. Comments on, or additions to, the check list will be appreciated.

[redacted]

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ATTACHMENT

BOOK DISPATCH NO. 321

POSSIBLE INDICATIONS OF ACTUAL RIS EMPLOYMENT OF SOVIET OFFICIALS ABROAD

I. Use of Automobiles

a. Possession of private automobile by official with rank of second secretary or below. Persons of higher rank with private cars may be legitimate foreign service officials, but owners of cars in the middle and lower ranks almost certainly are RIS.

b. Official driving his own car. According to [redacted], legitimate Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) personnel do not drive their own cars, but use drivers. In fact, except for RIS personnel, few MID employees know how to drive.

c. Employing an indigenous instructor to teach an official how to drive. [redacted] claims that action of this sort is a strong indication that the Soviet official involved is RIS.

d. Paying for gasoline or car repairs by other than the normal means employed by the local Soviet official installation. In Vienna, as late as 1954, only MVD officers paid cash for gas and repairs at certain contract Austrian-run garages. Legitimate Soviet MVD and military personnel paid for car services in chits redeemable by the local Soviet installation. In another European capital, where all Soviet official cars are serviced in one indigenous-operated garage, all the cars are billed for gasoline on one sheet, except for a small group of cars used by known or suspected RIS officers. Separate bills are made out for each of the latter group of cars for gasoline used, very possibly to comply with RIS accounting procedures. The above examples indicate that field stations might explore advantageously the possibility of recruiting employees of garages servicing Soviet official automobiles, to try to detect anomalies such as the above.

e. Official or chauffeur parking his car in a garage or lot separate from a central MID motor pool. In Austria, in 1954, the MVD had its own motor pool separate from the MID motor pool located across the street.

II. Unusual Working Hours

a. Working late often. Statements of the [redacted] indicate that RIS officers usually work hard and it is possible that these officers might have to spend several evenings a week in the office. According to [redacted] legitimate MID employees on the other hand (with the exception possibly of the Ambassador or other high MID officials), work little or no overtime. Physical surveillance of Soviet installations in the early and late evening hours might well reveal those Soviets who fairly habitually spend evenings at the office.

b. It has been reported that RIS officers are required at least to deposit sensitive materials and possibly to make routine contact reports at the local Soviet installation immediately after each agent meeting. Although this was not normally done by MVD case officers in Austria up to 1954, due to local security regulations which might have been unique, the practice was observed on several occasions in at least one country as late as 1955. Again, physical surveillance of local Soviet installations through the late evening hours might reveal fairly regular evening visits by certain Soviet personnel suggestive of post-agent-meeting behavior.

III. Nature of Duties

a. In each country in which Soviet installations are located, there is stationed one or more Soviet State Security representatives responsible for maintaining the security of all Soviet citizens in the country, including all Soviet official personnel. These representatives, called Soviet Colony (SK) men, meet all Soviet delegations visiting the country and are responsible for making all housing, entertainment, and other arrangements for them. They might also be in contact with members of Soviet ships visiting the country. If telephone taps, physical surveillance or other sources indicate that certain local Soviet personnel habitually meet and make arrangements for visiting Soviet delegations or seamen, it is highly probable that they are SK officers.

b. [redacted] claims that, as of early 1954, practically all Soviet consular officers and consular clerical personnel abroad were State Security [redacted] states that, as of the time of his defection, 80 per cent of consular personnel throughout the world were State Security, 5 per cent Military Intelligence, and the remaining 15 per cent genuine MID. On the basis of the above statements, more than the usual amount of suspicion of RIS connection should be attached to all consular officers and employees.

IV. Social Contacts and Activities

a. Social contact with foreigners. Except for ambassadors and high diplomatic officials, bona fide MID officers and employees abroad are not encouraged to associate with foreigners. RIS officers, on the other hand, are encouraged to make such associations.

b. Engaging in extensive entertainment. If an ostensible Soviet official of low or middle ranks entertains a great deal, it is probable that he is RIS.

V. Living outside Soviet compounds. Although high ranking bona fide MID officials and occasionally other non-RIS personnel may live in private dwellings, middle or low ranking officials living in separate houses or apartments quite probably are RIS.

VI. Publications. State Security (and probably Military Intelligence) personnel abroad subscribe to many local newspapers and publications, including technical, military, emigre, etc. Although press attaches, TASS representatives, political and cultural attaches and certain other legitimate MID officials might also subscribe to these publications, any Soviet official who receives many publications and who does not occupy a slot which apparently justifies receipt of the publications might be looked upon with some suspicion.

VII. Association with known or suspected RIS officers. According to [redacted], State Security and Military Intelligence officers and employees tend to associate socially almost exclusively with other members of their own service. This tendency has been confirmed to some extent in at least one field station. Thus, it might well be worth while to try to ascertain persons with whom known or suspected RIS officers associate socially.